Relative values: perspectives on a neuroimaging technology from above and within the ethical landscape by Samuel, Gabrielle et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Relative Values: Perspectives on a Neuroimaging Technology
From Above and Within the Ethical Landscape
Gabrielle Samuel & Alan Cribb & John Owens &
Clare Williams
Received: 17 November 2014 /Accepted: 29 December 2015 /Published online: 22 June 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this paper we contribute to Bsociology in
bioethics^ and help clarify the range of ways sociological
work can contribute to ethics scholarship.We do this using
a case study of an innovative neurotechnology, functional
magnetic resonance imaging, and its use to attempt to
diagnose and communicate with severely brain-injured
patients. We compare empirical data from interviews with
relatives of patients who have a severe brain injury with
perspectives from mainstream bioethics scholars. We use
the notion of an Bethical landscape^ as an analogy for the
different ethical positions subjects can take—whereby a
person’s position relative to the landscape makes a differ-
ence to the way they experience and interact with it. We
show that, in comparison to studying abstract ethics Bfrom
above^ the ethical landscape, which involves universal
generalizations and global judgements, studying ethics
empirically Bfrom the ground,^ within the ethical land-
scape foregrounds a more plural and differentiated picture.
We argue it is important not to treat empirical ethics as
secondary to abstract ethics, to treat on-the-ground per-
spectives as useful only insofar as they can inform ethics
from above. Rather, empirical perspectives can illuminate
the plural vantage points in ethical judgments, highlight the
Blived^ nature of ethical reasoning, and point to all ethical
vantage points as being significant. This is of epistemic
importance to normative ethics, since researchers who pay
attention to the various positions in and trajectories through
the ethical landscape are unlikely to think about ethics in
terms of abstract agency—as can happen with top-down
ethics—or to elide agency with the agency of
policymakers. Moreover, empirical perspectives may have
transformative implications for people on the ground, es-
pecially where focus on the potential harms and benefits
they face brings their experiences and interests to the
forefront of ethical and policy discussion.
Keywords Empirical bioethics . fMRI . Vegetative
state . Qualitative research . Ethics
Introduction
A growing body of literature highlights the limitations
of abstract ethical reasoning for understanding the real-
life ethical situations people face (Fox 1976; Haimes
2002; Samuel and Brosnan, 2011; Williams and
Wainwright 2010). So called Bempirical ethics^ ap-
proaches, which deploy social science methods to
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investigate ethical issues, have emerged to account for
this and have made a contribution to ethics scholarship
(for example, see Fox 1976; Kleinman 1999; Haimes
2002). Moreover, by drawing attention to the potential
harms and benefits faced by people in situ, such ap-
proaches may have transformative implications by
bringing the experiences and interests of people on the
ground to the forefront of ethical and policy discussion.
Within the broad current of empirical ethical work,
some social scientists have more recently come to view
themselves as undertaking Bsociology in bioethics,^ for
example, by exploring the situated nature of ethical
issues in clinical practice or in relation to innovative
health technologies (for example, see Fox 1976;
Williams et al. 2005). The construction sociology in
bioethics is designed to evade the sub-disciplinary re-
strictions of either sociology for bioethics (an insider but
essentially Bservantile^ conception of the role of sociol-
ogy) or sociology of bioethics (an outsider and essen-
tially critical conception). In this paper we aim tomake a
substantive contribution to sociology in bioethics and to
help indicate and clarify the range of ways sociological
work can contribute to ethics scholarship.
The substantive theme we have chosen to explore here
concerns the use of an innovative neurotechnology, func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI1), in the
attempt to diagnose and communicate with severely
brain-injured patients. We draw upon empirical data from
interviews with relatives of patients who have a severe
brain injury, indicating how relatives construct and
experience the ethical issues surrounding the use of
fMRI technology and contrasting this with perspectives
about the technology frommainstream bioethics scholars.
We highlight the human-centred ethical perspectives
found on the ground and ask about the potential benefits
of empirically engaging with such perspectives.
In addition to defending the normative relevance of
relatives’ perspectives (or other implicated parties), we
wish to differentiate between approaches to empirical
ethics which use Bstakeholder^ perspectives as a means
of moving towards global ethical judgements (through
theoretical or practical syntheses) and those which un-
derline the plurality of ethical vantage points and ques-
tion the traditional centre of gravity of ethical analysis.
Whilst we see our findings as potentially relevant to
both of these broad conceptions of empirical ethics, we
are particularly eager to stress the distinctiveness and
value of the latter conception.
This paper partly builds upon earlier work done by
Cribb and colleagues (2008), which explored the idea of
ethical Brole positions^ (Cribb et al. 2008). Based on
interviews with translational research scientists and cli-
nicians, the authors examined how the respective roles
of these agents shaped their ethics. Since different pro-
fessional and institutional settings have different cultural
and social norms and expectations, the authors argued
that the ethics of those within each setting needs to be
understood as a product of the Bethical space^ they
occupy, that is, in terms of their Brole position.^ In this
case, the scientists and clinicians constructed the rele-
vant ethical issues differently and had different ethical
obligation sets. The authors argued that this has impor-
tant normative relevance:
Unless we understand the social construction of
ethical positions… we will be unable to sensibly
understand or attribute responsibility, or make
judgements about what is defensible, or make
informed recommendations about how things
might be done better (359).
Here we wish to extend this reading to encompass all
those who might be affected by, or implicated in, bio-
medical innovation. In particular, we want to argue that
the role position of patients’ relatives is not only a
valuable lens for understanding the ethics of fMRI use
but also itself an important focus for ethics analysis.
In order to develop our points, we make use of an
extended analogy: exploring ethics is like exploring a
landscape, and a person’s position relative to the land-
scape makes a difference to the way they experience and
interact with it. Specifically, we have in mind a rough
contrast between two broad perspectives: exploration
that is done through a global top-down process (akin
to cartography) and exploration that is done from the
position of a traveller situated within the landscape. The
researcher in the analytic tradition of ethics tends to be
engaged in a process which aims to create a general
abstract map which objectively or neutrally represents
the landscape from above; by contrast, social science
researchers often examine or even adopt the position of
the traveller situated within the landscape itself, paying
attention to the socially embedded, context-specific and
role-specific dimensions of ethics.
1 fMRI is a brain scanning technique which measures brain activ-
ity by detecting associated changes in blood flow to different areas
of the brain
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In this paper we outline the fMRI research and sum-
marise the commentary that surrounds it within analyt-
ical bioethics. We then present our empirical methods
and findings from the interviews with relatives,
highlighting how they relate to, and diverge from, the
more abstract ethical literature. In particular we consider
one aspect of the mainstream ethical literature—the idea
that society has a moral obligation to use fMRI for
severely brain-injured patients given the potential that
these patients may have some level of awareness (or
Bmorally important competencies^). Some scholars
have argued that identifying awareness levels of brain-
injured individuals may have a direct impact on
decision-making regarding treatment and prognosis
(Bendsten 2013; Brukamp 2013). We compare this with
the ways in which interviewees discuss the concerns
they have with the technology. We suggest that the
divergences between the literature and interviewees
show the importance of taking role positions within
the landscape seriously. We conclude by reflecting on
the implications of this kind of research for the focus of,
and approaches to, empirical ethics work.
fMRI and Severe Brain Injury
Patients with a severe brain injury are generally classi-
fied as being in a vegetative state (VS) or a minimally
conscious state (MCS). Clinicians define VS as
Bwakeful unresponsiveness.^ Individuals in a VS have
automatic functions such as being able to breathe on
their own and having cycles of eye closure and opening
(sleep-wake cycle), and may have reflexes such as a
startle reflex or retracting from pain, but there is no sign
of awareness and no evidence that the patient can per-
ceive the environment or themselves, communicate with
others, or form intentions. In a MCS, individuals fluc-
tuate between levels of unawareness and levels of
awareness of themselves and the environment—levels
of awareness where they may have emotional responses
to family members, say words or phrases and gesture,
and/or show evidence of memory, attention and inten-
tion. However, awareness may be fleeting (Fins 2008).
For both states, patients are usually independent of all
machines apart from the one delivering artificial nutri-
tion and hydration (which keeps VS and some MCS
patients alive) (Report of a working party of the Royal
College of Physicians 2003). VS and MCS may be
transient stages in the recovery from coma or may
persist until death. Prognosis is influenced by age, by
the underlying cause, and by the state’s current duration.
A little over half of those in a VS one month after a
trauma will regain awareness, though with other causes,
fewer than twenty per cent will recover after a month.
The prognosis for MCS is more open than for a VS, but,
for both states, the prognosis remains very limited for
the majority of patients after being in VS or MCS for
some time, even if they recover full consciousness.
The treatment of patients with severe brain injuries
raises a range of social and ethical issues. Such issues
often centre around clinical concerns such as patient
management and the need for appropriate treatment
and support. Concerns also relate to end-of-life deci-
sion-making. At present artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion can be withdrawn if an individual in the United
Kingdom and the United States is deemed permanently
vegetative. In the United Kingdom, theMental Capacity
Act 2005 now applies to patients who are in an MCS.
This Act states that decisions for individuals who lack
capacity should be made based on the patient’s wishes,
feelings, and values, even if they have not made a valid
and applicable advance decision. At present there has
only been one family who has brought this Act to the
courts, and their application was rejected (Jackson
2013). There has been much debate surrounding this
controversial decision both in the academic literature
(Gillon 2012; Sheather 2013; Huxtable 2013; Johnston
2013; Mullock 2013) and in the media (Adams 2012).
Moreover, the legal distinction between VS and MCS
patients has been deemed ethically problematic (Kahane
and Savulescu 2009). Johnson, for example, has argued
that Bconsciousness should not preclude the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment for minimally conscious
patients any more than it does for other conscious
patients^ (Johnson 2010) because, for example, there
is a possibility that life in a MCS—in which patients
may be able to feel pain, have an emotional response
and have insight into their plight—may be worse than in
a VS (Demertzi et al. 2011). Fins and colleagues have
also argued that there is no typical MCS or VS patient:
each patient varies in their injury, diagnosis, and prog-
nosis, and this is confounded by the fact that, firstly,
diagnoses are not fixed but transient, and, second, mis-
diagnosis of the MCS is high (Fins 2006).
Diagnosis of the VS and MCS can be incredibly chal-
lenging and as many as forty per cent of individuals are
diagnosed incorrectly (Andrews et al. 1996; more recently
confirmed in Schnakers et al. 2009). In response,
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neuroscientists have recently made great efforts to try and
assess brain function, mental state, and consciousness,
using innovative neuroimaging technologies such as
fMRI and positron emission tomography (PET)2
(Fernandez-Espejo et al. 2011; Goldfine et al. 2011; John
et al. 2011). Such techniques are not therapies but rather
aim to determine an individual’s level of retained brain
activity or awareness by non-invasively providing images
of the brain for analysis. Two particular pioneering studies
have been widely reported. One 2006 study involved a
twenty-three-year-old woman who had been diagnosed as
vegetative (Owen et al. 2006). fMRI was used to scan the
woman’s brain whilst she was asked to imagine different
tasks. The researchers found that the patient’s neural
responses were indistinguishable from those observed in
healthy volunteers via fMRI. They concluded Bthis patient
retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to
respond to them through her brain activity^ and
Bconfirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously
aware of herself and her surroundings^ (1402). In 2010, a
subsequent paper by the same research group (Monti et al.
2010) reported on a similar study of fifty-four individuals.
The authors reported that of the fifty-four,
… five were able to wilfully modulate their brain
activity … In three of these patients, additional
bedside testing revealed some sign of awareness,
but in the other two patients no voluntary behav-
iour could be detected by means of clinical assess-
ment. (579)
The researchers reported that one man, who at the time
of scanning showed Bsigns of awareness … consistent
with the minimally conscious state^ (585), was able to
use their technique to answer Byes^ or Bno^ to questions
during the fMRI. The authors concluded that Bwith
further development this technique could be used
by some patients to express their thoughts, control
their environment, and increase their quality of life^
(589).
These two studies, as well as other similar
neurotechnological developments, sparked wide debate
in the ethical literature about how such innovative technol-
ogies impact on severely brain injured individuals and their
treatment. Below we explore this literature more closely
and consider how the prominent concerns of scholars can
be contrasted with interviewees’ views about the use of
fMRI for severely brain-injured individuals.
Commentary on the Use of fMRI Technology
From Within the Analytic Bioethics Literature
The ethics of using fMRI technology for patients with
severe brain injuries has been the subject of growing
discussion within the top-down analytic bioethics liter-
ature: the use of such technology has been discussed
with reference to the canon of well-established philo-
sophical and legal principles. For instance, a prominent
strand of discussion has centred around the nature of
personhood. Scholars have questioned what it means to
be a person and what it means to be conscious as well as
questioning how we define such states, how we distin-
guish between the absence of consciousness and its
minimal presence, and whether such states can be sci-
entifically quantified through the use of neuroimaging
techniques (for example, see Chien-Chang Wu 2008;
Farah 2008; Schwartz and Schwartz 2008; Wilkinson
and Savulescu 2008).
Another strand that has come to dominate the debate
in the literature concerns how far fMRI challenges our
existing beliefs about end-of-life decision-making for
individuals with severe brain injuries. Many scholars
have questioned the potential use of fMRI as a tool for
asking those unable to overtly communicate whether
they wish to live or die (Fisher and Appelbaum 2010;
Sinnott-Armstrong 2011; Schwarzbauer and Schafer
2011). The literature includes a wide range of papers,
from those which just raise the issue briefly to those
which provide more detailed discussions (Bernat 2010;
Fins 2010). Scholarship has been approached from a
legal angle (Eisenberg 2008; Bressman and Reidler
2010; Fisher and Appelbaum 2010) and a philosophical
perspective (Friedrich 2013). Some has provided a cau-
tionary note. In the latter instance, scholars have warned
that fMRI is still at an investigational stage with only
preliminary results and that findings may not as yet be
able to predict meaningful recovery (Wilkinson et al.
2009) or allow for communication about end-of-life
decisions (Fins and Schiff 2010; Jox et al. 2012).
More recently, a number of papers in this literature
have claimed that there is a moral imperative to develop
and use fMRI technology for patients with severe
2 PET is an imaging technology that produces three-dimensional
images of the functional processes within the body. It does this by
imaging the body after a biologically active (tracer) molecule is
introduced to the body
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brain injuries. For example, Bendsten (2013) ar-
gues that there:
… is an ethical obligation to use [fMRI, electro-
encephalograms3 or other similar technologies] to
diagnose more accurately the patient diagnosed as
having a disorder of consciousness, and that this
obligation may stretch to investigate the possibil-
ities for communication and potential decision-
making capacity. (50)
Bendsten suggests that using fMRI technology may
generate possibilities for communicating with patients
in VS or MCS, creating the opportunity for receiving
informed consent for further forms of treatment. As
such, her argument is based on principles of respect
for persons and respect for patient autonomy. On a
similar basis, Brukamp has argued that in the developed
world there is an ethical Bobligation to perform fMRI on
each patient with a chronic disorder of consciousness^
(2013, 5) on the grounds that, where available, the
technology is able to provide a more accurate diagnosis,
which will be in the best interests of the patient.
Leaving aside the reasonableness and broad validity
of these claims, these arguments provide good examples
of the way in which top-down, global judgements are
deployed in bioethics: they are generalizing judgements
that appeal to abstract ethical principles and pertain to a
non-specific and abstract ethical agent. For our current
purposes, it is especially important to note the difference
between invoking an abstract, hypothetical agent as
opposed to invoking the actual agents who occupy the
specific contexts and subject positions under consider-
ation.4 From an abstract perspective it is possible to
make broad in-principle judgements about singular eth-
ical issues. From the position of real agents—however
general and influential their role—practical judgements
about traversing the ethical landscape need to be made,
and these judgements occur in clusters rather than as
singularities and are typically made in concert, negotia-
tion, or conflict with other differently placed agents.
Moreover, the practical ethical judgements made by real
agents cannot be treated as neutral, objective, or
impartial questions since these judgements must be
considered within the substantive circumstances in
which the agents concerned are immersed. It is to ex-
amples of real-life and situated ethical dilemmas that we
now turn.
Exploring Ethics on the Ground: Interviews
With Relatives
In the following section we present empirical data taken
from interviews with relatives of patients who have a
severe brain injury. These data highlight some diver-
gences between academic claims about the obligation to
use fMRI in a clinical context and the concerns of
families.
There is a very small population of individuals who
not only have relatives with a severe brain injury but are
also aware of the fMRI technology.5Moreover, they are a
particularly vulnerable population: they are hard to reach
in terms of recruitment and are therefore under-
represented in research studies. Family members with
personal experience of this issue were reached via a brain
injury support group. Six individuals expressed interest
andwere providedwith an information sheet, and consent
was gained to interview in each case (one interview was
conducted as a joint session with husband and wife). As a
qualitative study, it was not our intention to recruit a
representative sample of participants for interview or to
generalize the findings. Rather, the aim of qualitative
study is to approach problems naturalistically, investigate
the experience of specific, contextualized individuals,
and discover the range of (often complex) views and
beliefs individuals may have, by allowing participants
to respond on their own terms and provide explanations
(Carter et al. 2010). Qualitative techniques, whilst
sacrificing statistical representativeness, can provide
deeper and more original understanding of a complex
issue (Carter et al. 2010) and, in this instance, of specific
individuals within this often neglected population. Thus,
whilst the experiences of our six participants are not
generalizable, we will show how they serve to highlight
new variables in the ethical debates about the use of fMRI
3 Otherwise known as EEG, this is a test that can detect abnor-
malities related to electrical activity of the brain.
4 The ethical position of some actual agents—perhaps specific
policy makers or senior professionals in relatively powerful
roles—may approximate to that of an abstracted agent but this
similarity is deceptive.
5 It was particularly important that the interviewees were aware of
the fMRI technology prior to the interview. This ensured that false
hope was not given to any of the interviewees, some of whom
were vulnerable, during the interview process.
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for severely brain-injured individuals not discussed in the
academic literature.
All six interviewees had considered fMRI for their
own relative—in fact three of the participants’ relatives
had undergone an fMRI. At the point of interview, three
of the participants’ relatives remained in a vegetative or
minimally conscious state, one had died while still in a
disorder of consciousness, and one had regained full
consciousness, although remaining severely disabled
(see Table 1).
Interviews were semi-structured, face-to-face, and
lasted between one and two hours; they were conducted
by the first author. Interviews took place in a location of
the participants’ own choosing (usually their home). It
was important that we met away from the hospital
setting and were not linked to the fMRI experimental
studies in any way that might have inhibited what inter-
viewees felt able to say. The interviews commenced
with a broad discussion about participants’ experiences
of having a relative with a disorder of consciousness and
then went on to focus on participants’ understanding
and opinions about the use of fMRI with such patients.
All interviews were audio recorded and fully tran-
scribed. Transcriptions were thematically analysed
using NVIVO (a qualitative data-analysis software
package), with each transcript being systematically cod-
ed for issues such as how interviewees first heard about
fMRI, their opinions about the pros and cons of fMRI,
and the way they spoke about Bhope.^ In the interests of
confidentiality, all names used in this article are pseu-
donyms. Due to the small population of individuals
from which participants for this project were sourced,
along with the particular vulnerability of these partici-
pants, some other identifying details have also been
altered (for a review of the importance of this practice,
please see Saunders, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger 2015).
Most obviously the perspective of families on the
ground are not uniform but diverse. In addition, these
perspectives are not wholly cognitive but are likely to be
held and expressed with affect. For family members,
these technologies represent a felt hope and risk, and the
pros and cons surrounding them are not just held in
intellectual balance but often experienced as emotional
ambivalence. In the narrative below, we discuss the
interviewees’ views about fMRI in a way which partic-
ularly highlights those participants’ beliefs least aligned
to the debates raised in the academic literature. In this
way we illustrate new variables so far not discussed in
the ethical literature relating to this technology. Ta
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Some interviewees believed strongly in the use of
fMRI for severely brain injured patients—Bideally you
would think that patients in these conditions could un-
dergo this scanning once a year, or something, to see if
there were any changes^ (Alison)—but this was not the
case for all interviewees. For example, Rachel, who
initially heard about the research in the news media
when she was Blooking for miracles,^ still finds the
technology Bamazing^ but is now much more sceptical
of it. She did not want to pursue trying to access this
technology for her husband, Ronald: Bit’s really fasci-
nating, it is fascinating, I would like to do it sometime
but then there’s a lot of reasons—my reasons for
not wanting to do it outweigh it at the moment^.
These reasons seemed complex but crucially relat-
ed to her concern that a negative finding from an
fMRI scan would Bprove against^ Ronald and the
continual struggle she had had for recognition that
her husband was Bin there.^ Other interviewees,
Laura and Neil, whose daughter had been in a vegetative
state for nine years, had different reasons for not want-
ing to pursue fMRI:
It’s like a double edge sword because if we found
that there was nothing there in a way that would’ve
been easier. It’s kind of like a fifty-fifty chance: do
we send Lavena there, does she have the tests done
and then if she’s found to not react at all do we then
think Bright, yes, ok, diagnosis correct, Lavena is
PVS.^ But then or how do we handle it if there is
something there but there’s not a damn thing that
we can do to get to her to reach her…so it was very,
very hard for us to weigh that up.
For this interviewee, her feelings of Bdread^ about the
fMRI grew: BWhat if there was something going on in
there?We’d feel so guilty that we haven’t tried harder to
get through to her—but yet we know that everything has
been done.^ She concludes: BI don’t want to go there, I
don’t want to put her or us through this—for different
reasons—us emotionally and him physically .^
Relatives, of course, were not only concerned about
their immediate families but had views with broader
policy relevance. These broader concerns were ground-
ed in their experiences but related more widely to the
social resources, conditions, contexts, and consequences
of technology use. Laura and Neil, for example, were
worried about the more widespread use of fMRI: BI
worry that other people may do it for their loved
[ones]—their loved ones will have a scan—but then
where do they go from there? What support is there
for them?^ Continuing, Byou get a case of ‘yes, there
might be something going on there,’ but actually ‘sorry
but we can’t do anything about it.’^
These interviews with relatives demonstrate that
making practical ethical judgements from within rather
than above an ethical landscape is a complex business
which may involve weighing a number of competing
beliefs, emotions, pressures, and expectations. The re-
sponses given by participants demonstrate the impor-
tant difference that positioning has for ethical decision
making: whilst an analytically-based argument to pur-
sue an innovative biomedical technology (such as those
proposed by Bendsten and Brukamp and colleagues
above) may on the surface seem straightforward and
morally sound, such arguments can pay insufficient
attention to the complex networks and levels through
which technology is operationalized, the multiple
agents and ethical positions involved, and thereby some
of the key ethical, social, and emotional complexities of
the whole ethical landscape.
Interviewees, for instance, highlighted the ways in
which everyday practices and existing technologies can
impact upon the care, comfort, and dignity of their
relative. These reflections often emphasized the material
constraints, experiential, and embodied effects and the
practicability of technology usage. First, relatives of
patients expressed reservations about the practicalities
arising from the fMRI technology and the negative
effect that a scan may have for the patient:
Even moving someone in Andrew’s condition,
like the ambulance journey, etcetera, can be traumat-
ic in a way that you or I couldn’t really understand.
It’s very, very tiring and if there is any awareness
there, it’s all change, it’s different, there are different
people, different environment. Andrew doesn’t react
terribly well to being put flat on his back—his limbs
will stiffen and you can see that's almost a sign of
protest. He does get used to it, but he can’t move, so
he has to be moved from one bed to another, slid
here, there and everywhere, it's all, it can be trau-
matic (Alison).
Do we want to put her through the upheaval of the
movement when she has a routine and she’s com-
fortable? And then there was also the problem of
the fact that she goes into spasm, and then she
would need to be very completely still for the
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scans to work, and obviously they couldn’t sedate
her because then that would be pointless, so there
was so many different things that we had to think
about (Laura).
Whilst concerns about access to the fMRI technology
have been highlighted to some degree in the academic
literature (for example, Tovino 2008), these interviewees’
narratives capture amuchmore personal, Blived^ account
of family beliefs and experiences of fMRI.
Second, relatives also expressed reservations about
the technology on the grounds that an fMRI scan was
unlikely to solve all, or even any, of the problems the
families face, and given the practical realities of their
situation, a scanmay even create more problems beyond
the initial test:
If you knew that your loved one could communi-
cate … that would be great, then of course you
would come to the situation of how do you ac-
commodate that, the fact that you can do it in the
scanner you can’t have someone in an MRI scan-
ner for the rest of their life (Alison)
I think if you can say that somebody is responding
then that is a very positive thing… But if you then
ask them BDo you want to stay like this?^ and you
got the answer Bno,^ what would you do about it?
… (Laugh) Nobody would ever dare ask that
question. Because that is the big issue isn’t it?
And that’s where euthanasia is… (Eli)
Similarly to Eli, academics have widely questioned the
potential effect of fMRI during end-of-life decision-
making and on decision-making in general. Academics
and scientists are also acutely aware of the drawback of
fMRI as an immoveable instrument—in fact, neurosci-
entists have begun exploring the use of electroencepha-
lography (EEG) as an alternative (Goldfine et al. 2011;
John et al. 2011). However, the academic and family
discourses diverge in their consideration of whether or
not to pursue this technology, with scholars focusing
much less of their attention on how the limited capabil-
ities of the fMRI technology are experienced by and
emotionally impact on families. This point is nicely
opened up in one of Rachel’s comments:
It’s not like something we can carry around with
him…what if you do get in there and then you’ve
got to take him away again … I find that really
hard. I thought, BWell, what if you do get in there
and then you’ve got to take him away again?What
if you get that little glimpse of him?^ It’s not like
you can live in the fMRI… and then it’s gone…
No I don’t want one. (Rachel)
Narratives such as this one and those above reveal that
relatives not only view the use of fMRI as unable to
solve the existing issues facing patients but also as very
likely to create new ethical problems. They highlight the
importance of considering how the drawbacks of fMRI
can impact on families before obligating such families to
consent to the use of the technology.
Finally, separate to their concerns about the fMRI
scanning, some of the interviewees spoke at some length
about their experiences in hospitals and the need for
basic care, support, and access to facilities. Whilst these
concerns did not detract from their views about research
and the possibilities that fMRI could hold, it did seem at
times that maintaining an adequate standard of dignity
and care for patients weighed more heavily on their
lives, and in a sense was either equally, or more impor-
tant, to them than this new technology:
I can remember coming in [the hospital] one day.
She’s on the ward and—no kidding—bearing in
mind Tracey can’t move herself, her arm was
through the thing like this [shows arm], and her
head was scrunched between the metal bar,
scrunched there and just laying there, and I went
ballistic, you know I said Bthere’s a nurse sitting
over there, can’t she see she’s stuck^ It was
dreadful—she’d always come back with bed sores
(Trudy).
Dignity is everything isn’t it, if you lose your
dignity it’s very difficult, and for me to see
Andrew without any dignity, it’s very hard, people
need to be aware of that (Alison).
Interviewees reported breakdowns in care for their
relative due to a lack of staff expertise with existing
equipment (for example the hoists used to move patients
around) and failures to provide or repair it (for example,
obtaining and maintain appropriate wheelchairs). They
were acutely aware of the context of care delivery and
thus sometimes questioned what fMRI could deliver in
practice, even if the scientists were successful in their
ambitions to develop its capability in ideal laboratory
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settings. Indeed, this finding reflects other research with
relatives of patients with a severe brain injury where the
recruitment method was not related to fMRI (Kitzinger
and Kitzinger 2012).
Discussion
We have noted some of the differences between the
perspectives of individuals who have a severely brain-
injured relative and the perspectives found in the more
abstract and generalized academic literature. Of course
we could have rehearsed perspectives from multiple
other real world agents—researchers, clinicians, budget
holders, journalists, policymakers, and so on. Each of
these sets of perspectives would illuminate both specific
aspects of and specific angles on the large and densely
organised ethical landscapes in which the relevant eth-
ical issues are embedded. Different positions within and
trajectories across the landscape will produce different
kinds of accounts. What seems salient will vary, as will
the nature and magnitude of costs and benefits of the
technology and the texture of the ethical issues it raises.
These perspectives from the ground can contribute to
understanding normative ethics in a range of ways. Here
we will briefly contrast four such ways, each indicating
partly complementary and partly competing emphases
in empirical ethics. First, they can be treated as feeding
into and moderating Bethics from above^ by, for exam-
ple, being used in reflective equilibrium approaches to
empirical ethics. That is, perspectives from the ground
provide evidence of, and formulations of, first-order
intuitions in reflective equilibrium approaches to empir-
ical ethics (Rawls 1971; van Thiel and van Delden
2010). This move partially grounds and thereby refines
Bglobal^ ethical readings and synthesizes diverse per-
spectives together. Second, there are analogous ap-
proaches to empirical ethics that seek to achieve a more
practical kind of synthesis between perspectives by
bringing diverse parties together in deliberative demo-
cratic exercises or smaller scale processes of mutual
deliberation and negotiation, such as is found in
Bdialogical ethics^ approaches (for example Kim et al.
2009; Widdershoven, Abma, and Molewijk 2009). It is
clear that attention and responsiveness to the relatives’
perspectives outlined above could play an important role
in such theoretical or practical syntheses. But empirical
ethics approaches can also be used—third—not for syn-
thesising but for positively emphasizing and exploring
the diversity of experiences and perspectives in ethics
and—fourth—for questioning the traditional centre of
gravity of ethical scholarship. It is the latter two empha-
ses that we wish to say a little more about here.
An understanding of ethics can only be partly accom-
plished by synthesising aspirations; it also depends upon
being ready to co-travel with multiple agents and expe-
rience the features, contours, and challenges of the land-
scapes from their perspectives. It needs to be stressed
that this is not simply a question of appearances—how
things look to various agents—nor are these perspec-
tives and concerns simply relevant Bdata.^ Different
things matter in different instances, and there is not
simply one over-arching ethical question but innumera-
ble ethical issues divided across differently placed
agents. For example, family members have ethical de-
cisions to make about how much to initiate or cooperate
with attempts to use fMRI imaging in the case of their
brain-injured relatives. For them there is comparatively
little to be gained by appealing to general arguments for
some over-arching ethical imperative. They will rightly
be concerned about the specific circumstances and cul-
tures of care their family members are, and might be,
encountering. They will also often be—in commonwith
clinicians—directly alive to questions about the material
constraints of technologies and to questions about prac-
tical feasibility and consequences. This indicates an
additional substantive reason for engaging in empirical
ethics: by drawing attention to the diverse variety of
issues that matter to agents situated within ethical land-
scapes, empirical ethics provides a way of recognizing,
respecting, and representing people on the ground.
Where empirical ethics is able to bring the experiences,
interests, and views of people on the ground to the
forefront of ethical and policy discussion—and thereby
to complement, modify, or even displace official or
dominant perspectives—it has the potential to be trans-
formative for these people. In addition, by recentring
ethics analysis around the ethical burdens and dilemmas
that have to be navigated on the ground, it offers nor-
mative as well as explanatory insights.
Academic arguments for a general imperative to de-
ploy fMRI are, of course, still valuable, especially if
they are qualified and inflected by attention to the per-
spectives of travellers through the relevant landscape.
These general arguments certainly have relevance to the
ethical judgements made by policymakers (the real
world near-analogue of the abstract agents associated
with the top-down or synthesizing perspective).
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However, if such policymakers want to make defensible
ethical decisions, they need to make them whilst also
being responsive to and ideally in conversation with
other actual agents. Attention to the various positions
in, and trajectories through, the ethical landscape makes
ethics researchers much less likely to equate the abstract
agency of top-down ethics with the agency of
policymakers. For a technology to be operationalized
requires a complex network of differently located agents
of which policymakers are just one part. None of these
sets of agents, including policymakers, are simply mak-
ing one big in-principle ethical judgement about the
defensibility and desirability of technology usage.
Rather, as dialogical approaches to ethics recognize,
each set of agents is in relationships with, and has ethical
obligations to, other agents. These obligations include
treating the ethical concerns of other agents with signif-
icance—not only because they help to illuminate one
portion of the full ethical landscape but also on their
own terms as of substantive ethical importance.
In summary, Bsociology in bioethics^ can inform
ethics from above, but, as we are stressing here, it can
also illuminate the plural forms of, and vantage points in,
ethics—the inherent diversity, complexity, and
situatedness of ethical experiences, dilemmas, and
judgements. Sociological contributions can also serve
to question the framing of ethics scholarship, including
the presumed centrality of certain agendas; for instance,
why the dilemmas of abstract global agents or relatively
powerful policymakers and professionals are frequently
located at the centre of the discipline and the dilemmas of
relatives, for example, are typically treated as marginal.6
Conclusion
Advances in biomedical technology, including
neurotechnology, notoriously give rise to new ethical
challenges. Some of these ethical challenges arrive at the
doorstep ofmembers of the public who just happen to be
in the right (or wrong) place at the right time. Ethics
scholarship has much to gain by devoting proper atten-
tion to the way ethical issues and dilemmas are experi-
enced and negotiated by ordinary persons such as the
relatives considered in this research. Such attention
could have transformative implications for patients and
families by placing their experiences, interests, and
views at the forefront of ethical and policy discussion.
For these reasons, we want to suggest, it is important not
to treat the study of on-the-ground perspectives such as
those of the relatives investigated here as of secondary
importance and as simply Binforming^ serious abstract
ethics from below.
Rather, empirical ethics has the potential to confront
important substantive ethical questions that might oth-
erwise be neglected and to illuminate the nature of ethics
as lived. Studying ethics from above the ethical land-
scape—aspiring towards universal generalizations and
global judgements—often has the character of rarefied
abstract reasoning. Studying ethics within the ethical
landscape foregrounds a more plural and differentiated
picture: it reveals a closer and more detailed account of
interlocking networks of multiple social conditions and
agents and brings with it various kinds of Bweight^—
related, for example, to practicability, materiality, and
embodied affect. This kind of focus is of epistemic
importance to normative ethics. If we seriously want to
consider the ethics of neuroimaging technology, for
example, we need to be ready to adopt the role positions
of the relatives considered here and ask ourselves what
we think we ought to do in the various situations in
which they find themselves. This does not make it
invalid to ask the more general, in principle, question
about whether there is an obligation for particular health
systems to make such technology available. But it does
mean we are also much more likely to be able to answer
this latter question with greater wisdom.
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